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Abstract. In the standard web browser programming model, third-
party scripts included in an application execute with the same privilege
as the application’s own code. This leaves the application’s confidential
data vulnerable to theft and leakage by malicious code and inadvertent
bugs in the third-party scripts. Security mechanisms in modern browsers
(the same-origin policy, cross-origin resource sharing and content secu-
rity policies) are too coarse to suit this programming model. All these
mechanisms (and their extensions) describe whether or not a script can
access certain data, whereas the meaningful requirement is to allow un-
trusted scripts access to confidential data that they need and to prevent
the scripts from leaking data on the side. Motivated by this gap, we
propose WebPol, a policy mechanism that allows a website developer to
include fine-grained policies on confidential application data in the fa-
miliar syntax of the JavaScript programming language. The policies can
be associated with any webpage element, and specify what aspects of
the element can be accessed by which third-party domains. A script can
access data that the policy allows it to, but it cannot pass the data (or
data derived from it) to other scripts or remote hosts in contravention
of the policy. To specify the policies, we expose a small set of new native
APIs in JavaScript. Our policies can be enforced using any of the nu-
merous existing proposals for information flow tracking in web browsers.
We have integrated our policies into one such proposal that we use to
evaluate performance overheads and to test our examples.
1 Introduction
Webpages today rely on third-party JavaScript to provide useful libraries, page
analytics, advertisements and many other features. JavaScript works on amashup
model, wherein the hosting page and included scripts share the page’s state
(called the DOM). Consequently, by design, all included third-party scripts run
with the same access privileges as the hosting page. While some third-party
scripts are developed by large, well-known, trustworthy vendors, many other
scripts are developed by small, domain-specific vendors whose commercial mo-
tives do not always align with those of the webpage providers and users. This
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2leaves sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, email ad-
dresses, click histories, cookies and location information vulnerable to inadver-
tent bugs and deliberate exfiltration by third-party scripts. In many cases, devel-
opers are fully aware that a third-party script accesses sensitive data to provide
useful functionality, but they are unaware that the script also leaks that data on
the side. In fact, this is a widespread problem [17].
Existing web security standards and web browsers address this problem un-
satisfactorily, favoring functionality over privacy. The same-origin policy (SOP) [5]
implemented in all major browsers restricts a webpage and third-party scripts
included in it to communicating with web servers from the including webpage’s
domain only. However, broad exceptions are allowed. For instance, there is no
restriction on request parameters in urls that fetch images and, unsurprisingly,
third-party scripts leak information by encoding it in image urls. The candidate
web standard Content Security Policy (CSP) [31], also implemented in most
browsers, allows a page to white list scripts that may be included, but places no
restriction on scripts that have been included, thus not helping with the prob-
lem above. Other mechanisms (including a provision in the SOP) restrict scripts
loaded in a different third-party window or frame from accessing the resources
of a page but do not restrict third-party scripts included in the page itself.
The academic community has recently proposed solutions based on infor-
mation flow control (IFC) [11,30,15,7,25,8,28,17], also known as mandatory ac-
cess control. Their ideal goal is to allow third-party scripts access to necessary
sensitive data, but restrict where scripts can send the data—and data derived
from that data—in accordance with a policy. While this would balance func-
tionality and privacy perfectly, all existing IFC-based solutions for web browsers
fall short of this ideal goal. Many proposals, including several taint-based so-
lutions [15,7,25,8], focus on the IFC mechanism, but currently lack adequate
support for specifying policies conveniently. Flowfox [30] provides a rich policy
framework but all websites are subject to the same policy, and the underlying
IFC technique, secure multi-execution [12], does not handle shared state soundly.
COWL [28] uses coarse-grained isolation, allowing scripts’ access to either remote
domains or the shared state, but not both. This requires significant code changes
when both are needed simultaneously (see Section 7 for more details).
The contribution of our work is WebPol, a policy framework that allows a
webpage developer to release data selectively to third-party scripts (to obtain
useful functionality), yet control what the scripts can do with the data. WebPol
integrates with any taint-based IFC solution to overcome the shortcomings listed
above. WebPol policies label sensitive content (page elements and user-generated
events) at source, and selectively declassify them by specifying where (to which
domains) the content and its derivatives can flow. Host page developers specify
WebPol policies in JavaScript, a language already familiar to them.
Under the hood, any taint-based IFC solution can be used to track data
flows and to enforce WebPol policies. As a demonstrative prototype, we have in-
tegrated WebPol with our previous taint-based IFC framework for WebKit [7,25],
the engine that powers Apple’s Safari and other browsers. We demonstrate the
3expressiveness of WebPol policies through examples and by applying WebPol to
two real websites. Through measurements, we demonstrate that WebPol policies
impose low-to-moderate overhead, which makes WebPol usable today. Through
a small lab study (described in Appendix B), we test that WebPol can be effec-
tively used by programmers familiar with HTML and JavaScript.
2 Overview
This section provides an overview of information flow control (IFC) in the con-
text of web browsers and lists important considerations in the design of WebPol.
IFC is a broad term for techniques that control the flow of sensitive informa-
tion in accordance with pre-defined policies. Sensitive information is information
derived from sources that are confidential or private. Any IFC system has two
components—the policy component and the enforcement component. The policy
component allows labeling of private information sources. The label on a source
specifies how private information from that source can be used and where it
can flow. The collection of rules for labeling is called the policy. The enforce-
ment component enforces policies. WebPol contributes a policy component to
complement existing work on enforcement components in web browsers. Many
existing enforcement components can be used with WebPol. For completeness,
we describe both policy and enforcement components here.
Policy component. The policy component provides a way to label or mark
sensitive data sources with labels that represent confidentiality and where data
can flow. In the context of webpages, data sources are objects generated in
response to user events like the content of a password box generated due to key
presses or a mouse click on a sensitive button, and data obtained in a network
receive event. In WebPol, data sources can be labeled with three kinds of labels,
in increasing order of confidentiality: 1) the label public represents non-sensitive
data, 2) for each domain domain, the label domain represents data private to
the domain; such data’s flow should be limited only to the browser and servers
belonging to domain and its subdomains, and 3) the label local represents
very confidential data that must never leave the browser. Technically, labels are
elements of the partial order public < domaini < local. Labels higher in the
order represent more confidentiality than labels lower in the order. These labels
are fairly expressive.1 For example, labeling a data source with the domain of
the hosting page prevents exfiltration to third-parties. Labeling a data source
with the domain of a third-party provider such as an page analytics provider
allows transfer to only that service.
Since most data on a webpage is not sensitive, it is reasonable to label data
sources public by default and only selectively assign a different label. WebPol
uses this blacklisting approach. Two nuances of source labeling are noteworthy.
1 Richer label models that support, for instance, conjunctions and disjunctions of
labels [27] are compatible with WebPol. However, we have not found the need for
such models so far.
4The first is its fine granularity. Not all objects generated by the same class of
events have the same label. For instance, characters entered in a password field
may have the domain label of the hosting page, limiting their flow only to the
host, but characters entered in other fields may be accessible to third-party
advertising or analytics scripts without restrictions. This leads to the following
requirement on the policy component.
Requirement 1: The policy component must allow associating different policies
with different elements of the page.
The second nuance is that the label of an object can be dynamic, i.e., history-
dependent. Consider a policy that hides from an analytics script how many times
a user clicked within an interactive panel, but wants to share whether or not the
user clicked at least once. The label of a click event on the panel is public the
first time the user clicks on it and private afterwards and, hence, it depends
on the history of user interaction. This yields the following requirement on the
policy component.
Requirement 2: Labels may be determined dynamically. This requirement means
that labels must be set by trusted policy code that is executed on-the-fly and that
has local state.
Enforcement component. Source data labels must be enforced even as scripts
transform and transmit the data. Existing literature is rife with techniques
for doing this, even in the context of web-browsers. Fine-grained taint track-
ing [17,15,7,25,8], coarse-grained taint tracking [28,6], secure multi-execution [12,30],
faceted execution [4,32] and static analysis [14,9,20] are some enforcement tech-
niques that have been considered in the context of JavaScript. They differ con-
siderably in their mechanics, their expressiveness and ease of fit with the browser
programming model. WebPol has been designed keeping fine-grained taint track-
ing (FGTT) in mind, so we explain that technique in some detail below.
In FGTT, the language runtime is modified to track information flows and to
attach a label (often called a taint) with each runtime object, including objects
on the stack, the heap and, in the context of web browsers, the DOM. Two
kinds of flows are typically considered. Explicit flows arise as a result of direct
assignment. In these cases, the label of the destination object is overwritten with
the label of the source object. Implicit flows arise due to control dependencies.
For instance, in pub = false; if (sec) pub = true, the final value of pub
depends on sec although there is no direct assignment from sec to pub. Implicit
flows are tracked by keeping a context label on the instruction pointer. Once both
explicit and implicit flows are tracked, enforcing policies is straightforward: An
outgoing communication with domain d’s servers is allowed only if the labels on
the payload of the communication and the instruction pointer at the point of
the communication are either public or d. This ensures that all labels attached
to source data are respected.
FGTT can be implemented either by modifying the browser’s JavaScript
engine to track flows and labels [15,7], or by a source-to-source transform of
5JavaScript code prior to execution [8]. There is a space and time overhead asso-
ciated with storing labels and tracking them. However, with careful engineering,
this overhead can be reduced enough to not be noticeable to end-users.
3 WebPol policy model
WebPol works on a browser that has already been augmented with IFC enforce-
ment. It provides a framework that allows setting labels at fine-granularity, thus
expressing and enforcing rich policies. This section describes the threat model
for WebPol and explains the WebPol design.
Threat model. WebPol prevents under-the-hood exfiltration of sensitive data
that has been provided to third-party scripts for legitimate reasons. So, third-
party scripts are not trusted but code from the host domain is trusted.
We are interested only in JavaScript-level bugs or exfiltration attempts. We
trust the browser infrastructure to execute all JavaScript code following the
language’s semantics and to dispatch events correctly. Low-level attacks that
target vulnerabilities in the browser engine are out of scope. Similarly, defend-
ing against network attacks (like man-in-the-middle attacks) is not our goal.
Orthogonal techniques like end-to-end encryption or HTTPS can be used to de-
fend against those attacks. Integrity attacks are also out of scope. For instance,
attacks based on sending requests containing no sensitive data to websites, where
the user might already be logged in, cannot be prevented using this model.
WebPol executes on top of an IFC enforcement in the browser. That en-
forcement is assumed to be correct and to track all flows. Prior work on such
enforcement has often been supplemented with formal proofs to show that the
enforcement is correct, at least abstractly [15,7,25].
WebPol’s policies are agnostic to specific channels of information leak. How-
ever, current IFC enforcements in browsers track only explicit and implicit flows.
Consequently, leaks over other channels such as timing and memory-usage are
currently out of scope. As IFC enforcements improve to cover more channels,
WebPol’s policies will extend to them as well.
3.1 Policies as event handlers
The first question in the design of WebPol is who should specify policies. Since
our goal is to prevent exfiltration of data by third-party scripts and it is the
developer of the host page who bootstraps the inclusion of scripts and best
understands how data on the page should be used, it is natural and pragmatic
to have the developer specify policies, possibly as part of the page itself.
The next question is how the developer specifies policies. To answer this,
we recall the two requirements we identified in Section 2—it should be possible
to specify different policies on different page elements and policies should be
allowed to include code that is executed on-the-fly to generate labels. When we
also consider the fact that sensitive data is usually generated by input events, it is
clear that policies should be page element-specific, (trusted) code that is executed
6after events have occurred (this code labels event-generated data). Fortunately,
web browsers provide exactly this abstraction in the form of event handlers! So,
we simply extend the event-handling logic in web browsers to express WebPol
policies. This allows us to leverage a lot of the existing browser logic for event
handler installation, parsing and event dispatch. Before explaining how we do
this, we provide a brief overview of event handling in web browsers.
Event handlers and event dispatch. Browsers execute JavaScript functions,
called event handlers, in response to input events like mouse clicks, key presses,
and asynchronous network receives. Save for network receive events, every event
has a target, which is an element in the page’s DOM where the event originated.
For instance, if a button is clicked, the target of the ensuing event is the button.
Code running on a page can add an event handler on any element on the page,
listening for a specific event. When an event occurs, all handlers associated
for that event with the event’s target and the target’s ancestors are triggered
sequentially. This is called event dispatch. The specific order in which handlers
are triggered is not relevant for our purposes (although it is fairly interesting for
IFC enforcement [25]). The whole process is bootstrapped by the static HTML
of the page, which may contain JavaScript that is executed when the page loads
initially, and this JavaScript installs the first set of event handlers.
Policy handlers. In WebPol, policies are special event handlers, specified using
a special marker in the HTML source of the hosting page. These special handlers,
called policy handlers, follow standard JavaScript syntax, can be attached to
any page element, listening for any event and, like other handlers, are triggered
every time the event is dispatched on the element or any of its descendants in
the DOM. However, unlike other handlers, the sole goal of policy handlers is to
assign labels to other sensitive objects, including the event being dispatched. To
allow the policy handlers to do this, we modify the browser slightly to afford
these handlers two special privileges:
– Policy handlers can execute two new JavaScript API functions that set labels
on other objects. No other JavaScript code can execute these two functions.
These functions are described later.
– During event dispatch all applicable policy handlers are executed before
ordinary handlers. This ensures that labels are set before ordinary handlers
(including those of third-party scripts) execute.
To maintain the integrity of the policies, policy handlers must be included in
the HTML source of the page directly. They cannot be installed dynamically
by JavaScript code. Otherwise, third-party scripts could install policy handlers
that set very permissive labels. Also, if a DOM element has a policy handler,
we disallow third-party scripts from detaching that element or moving it else-
where, as that can change the interpretation of the policy. Similarly, changing
the attributes of such an element is restricted.
Since different policy handlers can be associated with different elements,
Requirement 1 is satisfied. Moreover, policy handlers are ordinary JavaScript
7Fig. 1: Workflow of the WebPol policy model
code, so they can also maintain local state in private variables, thus satisfying
Requirement 2.
The workflow of policy interpretation in WebPol is shown in Figure 1. We
briefly summarize the steps:
1. The web page developer specifies the policy in the host HTML page in the
form of special event handlers.
2. The browser parses the policy and registers its handlers (mostly like usual
handlers, but with the two special privileges mentioned above).
3. When an event dispatches, listening policy handlers are executed first.
4. These policy handlers set labels on objects affected by the event, including
the event object itself. They may also update any local state they maintain.
5. The remaining event handlers are dispatched as usual. The IFC enforcement
in the browser enforces all labels that have been set by the policy handlers
(during any prior event’s dispatch), thus preventing any data leak in contra-
vention of the labels.
3.2 Integration with the web browser
WebPol needs minor modifications to the browser to parse and interpret policies
and to expose additional JavaScript API functions to set labels.
HTML and event dispatch changes. WebPol adds an HTML extension to
differentiate policy code from other JavaScript code. Concretely, we change the
browser’s parser to interpret any script file with the extension .policy included
directly in the host page as a policy. If such a policy script installs a handler,
it is treated as a policy handler. Additionally, a policy script can set labels on
the page’s global variables and DOM elements (like password fields). If a script
does this, it should be included in the host page before third-party scripts that
use those variables. WebPol also requires a small change to the browser’s event
dispatch mechanism to execute policy handlers before other handlers.
81 var p = document.getElementById("pwd");
2 p.addEventListener("keypress", function (e){
3 var score = checkPwdStrength(p.value);
4 document.getElementById("pwdStrength").innerText = score;
5 new Image().src = "http://stealer.com/pwd.jsp?pwd="+p +score;
6 });
Listing 1: Password strength checking script that leaks the password
Label-setting APIs. WebPol exposes two new JavaScript API functions to set
labels. These functions can be called only by the policy code in .policy files
and handlers installed by such files (we modify the browser to enforce this).
The function setLabel(label) sets the label of the object on which it is
called to label. As explained earlier, label can be public, a domain name, or
local (the default is public). Once an object’s label is set, it is enforced by the
underlying IFC enforcement. The special label HOST is a proxy for the domain
of the host page.
The function setContext(label) can be called only on an event object. It
restricts the visibility of the event to label label and higher. In simple terms,
if label is a domain, then only that domain can ever learn that this event oc-
curred, whereas if label is local, then no domain can ever learn that this event
occurred. Technically, this is accomplished by setting the so-called pc or program
counter label of event handlers running during the dispatch to label, which en-
sures that their side-effects (writes to DOM and network communication) are
labeled label or higher.
As opposed to setLabel, which makes individual data objects (like password
fields) private, setContext makes the existence of an event private. This is use-
ful. For instance, clicking on the “politics” section of a news feed might indicate
that the user is interested in politics, which may be private information, so the
page may want to hide even the existence of click events from third-party scripts.
(The distinction between the privacy of event content and event occurrence has
been previously described by Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [24].)
4 Examples
We illustrate the expressiveness of WebPol policies through a few examples.
Example 1: Password strength checker. Many websites deploy password
strength checkers on pages where users set new passwords. A password strength
checker is an event handler from a third-party library that is triggered each time
the user enters a character in the new password field. The handler provides visual
feedback to the user about the strength of the password entered so far. Strength
checkers usually check the length of the password and the diversity of characters
used. Consequently, they do not require any network communication. However,
standard browser policies cannot enforce this and the password strength checker
91 function currencyConverter() {
2 var toCur = document.getElementById("to").value;
3 var xh = new XMLHttpRequest();
4 xh.onreadystatechange = function() {
5 if (xh.readyState == 4) {
6 currencyRate = eval(xhttp.responseText);
7 var aAmt = document.getElementById("amt").value;
8 var convAmt = aAmt * currencyRate;
9 document.getElementById("camt").innerHTML = convAmt;
10 xh.open("GET","http://currConv.com/amount.jsp?atc=" + aAmt);
11 xh.send(); }}
12 xh.open("GET","http://currConv.com/conv.jsp?toCur=" + toCur, true);
13 xh.send(); }
Listing 2: Currency converter script that leaks a private amount
can easily leak the password if it wants to. Listing 1 shows such a “leaky” pass-
word checker. The checker installs a listener for keypresses in the password field
(line 2). In response to every keypress, the listener delivers its expected func-
tionality by checking the strength of the password and indicating this to the user
(lines 3, 4), but then it leaks out the password to stealer.com by requesting an
image at a url that includes the password (line 5). The browser’s standard SOP
allows this.
With WebPol, the developer of the host webpage can prevent any exfiltration
of the password by including the policy script:
document.getElementById("pwd").setLabel("HOST");
This policy sets the label of the password field to the host’s own domain using the
function setLabel(). Subsequently, the IFC enforcement restricts all outgoing
communication that depends on the password field to the host.
Conceptually, this example is simple because it does not really leverage the
fine-granularity of WebPol policies and FGTT. Here, the third-party script does
not need any network communication for its intended functionality and, hence,
simpler confinement mechanisms that prohibit a third-party script from commu-
nicating with remote servers would also suffice. Our next example is a scenario
where the third-party script legitimately needs remote communication. It lever-
ages the fine-granularity of WebPol policies and FGTT.
Example 2: Currency conversion. Consider a webpage from an e-commerce
website which displays the cost of an item that the user intends to buy. The
amount is listed in the site’s native currency, say US dollars (USD), but for the
user’s convenience, the site also allows the user to see the amount converted to
a currency of his/her choice. For this, the user selects a currency from a drop-
down list. A third-party JavaScript library reads both the USD amount and
the second currency, converts the amount to the second currency and inserts it
into the webpage, next to the USD amount. The third-party script fetches the
current conversion rate from its backend service at currConv.com. Consequently,
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1 var p = document.getElementbyId("sect_name");
2 p.addEventListener("click",function(event){
3 event.setLabel("HOST"); });
Listing 3: Policy that allows counting clicks but hides details of the clicks
1 clickCount = 0;
2 var p = document.getElementbyId("sect_name");
3 p.addEventListener("click",function clkHdlr(e){ clickCount += 1; });
Listing 4: Analytics script that counts clicks
it must send the name of the second currency to its backend service, but must not
send the amount being converted (the amount is private information). The web
browser’s same-origin policy has been relaxed (using, say, CORS [19]) to allow
the script to talk to its backend service at currConv.com. The risk is that the
script can now exfiltrate the private amount. Listing 2 shows a leaky script that
does this. On line 13, the script makes a request to its backend service passing
to the second currency. The callback handler (lines 4–11) reads the amount from
the page element amt, converts it and inserts the result into the page (lines 6–9).
Later, it leaks out the amount to the backend service on line 10, in contravention
of the intended policy.
With WebPol, this leak can be prevented with the following policy that sets
the label of the amount to the host only:
document.getElementById("amt").setLabel("HOST")
This policy prevents exfiltration of the amount but does not interfere with the
requirement to exfiltrate the second currency. Importantly, no modifications are
required to a script that does not try to leak data (e.g., the script obtained by
dropping the leaky line 10 of Listing 2).
Example 3: Web analytics. To better understand how users interact with
their websites, web developers often include third-party analytics scripts that
track user clicks and keypresses to generate useful artifacts like page heat-maps
(which part of the page did the user interact with the most?). Although a web
developer might be interested in tracking only certain aspects of their users’
interaction, the inclusion of the third-party scripts comes with the risk that the
scripts will also record and exfiltrate other private user behavior (possibly for
monetizing it later). Using WebPol, the web developer can write precise policies
about which user events an analytics script can access and when. We show several
examples of this.
To allow a script to only count the number of occurrences of a class of events
(e.g., mouse clicks) on a section of the page, but to hide the details of the indi-
vidual events (e.g., the coordinates of every individual click), the web developer
can add a policy handler on the top-most element of the section to set the la-
bel of the individual event objects to HOST. This prevents the analytics script’s
listening handler from examining the details of individual events, but since the
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1 var alreadyClicked = false;
2 var p = document.getElementById("sect_name");
3 p.addEventListener("click",function(event){
4 if (alreadyClicked = true) event.setContext("HOST");
5 else {alreadyClicked = true; event.setLabel("HOST");} });
Listing 5: Policy that tracks whether a click happened or not only
handler is still invoked at each event, it can count their total number. Listings 3
and 4 show the policy handler and the corresponding analytics script that counts
clicks in a page section named sect_name.
Next, consider a restriction of this policy, which allows the analytics script to
learn only whether or not at least one click happened in the page section, com-
pletely hiding clicks beyond the first. This policy can be represented in WebPol
using a local state variable in the policy to track whether or not a click has hap-
pened. Listing 5 shows the policy. The policy uses a variable alreadyClicked
to track whether or not the user has clicked in the section. Upon the user’s first
click, the policy handler sets the event’s label to the host’s domain (line 5). This
makes the event object private but allows the analytics handler to trigger and
record the occurrence of the event. On every subsequent click, the policy handler
sets the event’s context to the host domain using setContext() (line 4). This
prevents the analytics script from exfiltrating any information about the event,
including the fact that it occurred.
Finally, note that a developer can subject different page sections to differ-
ent policies by attaching different policy handlers to them. The most sensitive
sections may have a policy that unconditionally sets the event context to the
host’s, effectively hiding all user events in those sections. Less sensitive sections
may have policies like those of Listings 5 and 3. Non-sensitive sections may have
no policies at all, allowing analytics scripts to see all events in them.
Example 4: Defending against overlay-based attacks. Appendix A de-
scribes a simple WebPol policy that defends against an attack where a malicious
script creates a transparent overlay over a sensitive element (like a password
field) to record user events like keypresses without policy protection.
Summary of WebPol expressiveness.We end this section by commenting on
the expressiveness of WebPol policies in broad terms. The security community
has extensively studied several aspects of policy labeling, colloquially called the
dimensions of declassification (see [26] for a survey). Broadly speaking, WebPol
policies cover three of these dimensions—the policies specify what data is de-
classified (dimension: what), to which domains (dimension: to whom) and under
what state (dimension: when). “What data is declassified” is specified by selec-
tively attaching policies to elements of the page. “Which domains get access” is
determined directly by the labels that the policy sets. Finally, labels generated
by policy handlers can depend on state, as illustrated in Listing 5.
There are two other common dimensions of labeling—who can label the
data (dimension: who) and where in the code can the labels change (dimen-
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sion: where). These dimensions are fixed in WebPol due to the specifics of our
problem: All policies are specified by the host page in statically defined policies.
5 Implementation
We have prototyped WebPol in WebKit, a popular open source browser engine
that powers many browsers including Apple’s Safari. Our implementation runs
on top of our prior IFC enforcement in WebKit that uses FGTT and a bit of on-
the-fly static analysis [7]. The IFC enforcement is highly optimized, and covers
most JavaScript native functions (the DOM API) [25]. It targets WebKit nightly
build #r122160 and works with the Safari web browser, version 6.0. Since it is
difficult to port our earlier implementation (not WebPol) to a newer version of
WebKit, we choose to evaluate WebPol on this slightly outdated setup. This
suffices since WebPol’s design is not affected by recent browser updates. The
source code is available online at: https://github.com/bichhawat/ifc4bc.
Our earlier IFC implementation modified approximately 6,800 lines in the
JavaScript engine, the DOM APIs and the event handling logic for FGTT. To
implement WebPol, we additionally modified the HTML parser to distinguish
policy files (extension .policy) from other JavaScript files and to give policy
code extra privileges. We also added the two new JavaScript API functions
setLabel() and setContext(). Finally, we modified the event dispatch logic to
trigger policy handlers before other handlers. In all, we changed 25 lines in the
code of the parser, added 60 lines for the two new API functions and changed
110 lines in the event dispatch logic. Overall, implementing WebPol has low
overhead, and we expect that it can also be ported to other browsers or later
versions of WebKit easily.
6 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is two-fold. First, we want to measure WebPol over-
head, both on parsing and installing policies during page load and on executing
policy handlers later. We do this for four examples presented in Section 4 and
for two real-world websites. Second, we wish to understand whether WebPol can
be used easily. Accordingly, we apply WebPol policies to two real-world websites
and report on our experience. We also conducted a small user-study where we
asked programmers not already familiar with WebPol to write WebPol policies
for the examples of Section 4 after a brief tutorial introduction. We relegate our
observations from the user-study to Appendix B and focus here only on perfor-
mance overheads and the application to real-world websites. All our experiments
were performed on a 3.2GHz Quad-core Intel Xeon processor with 8GB RAM,
running Mac OS X version 10.7.4 using the browser configuration described in
Section 5.
Performance overheads on synthetic examples. To measure WebPol’s run-
time overhead, we tested four examples from Section 4 (Examples 1, 2 and
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JavaScript Execution Time Page Load Time
Example # Base IFC WebPol Base IFC WebPol
Example 1 2430 2918(+20.1%)
2989
(+1.9%) 16
17
(+6.3%)
19
(+12.5%)
Example 2 3443 4361(+26.7%)
5368
(+29.2%) 41
43
(+4.9%)
46
(+7.2%)
Example 3
(count) 1504
1737
(+15.5%)
1911
(+11.6%) 24
25
(+4.2%)
31
(+25.0%)
Example 3
(presence) 1780
2095
(+17.7%)
2414
(+18.9%) 26
28
(+7.7%)
30
(+7.7%)
Table 1: Performance of examples from Section 4. All time in ms. The percent-
ages in parentheses in the column IFC are overheads relative to Base. Similar
numbers in the column WebPol are additional overheads, still relative to Base.
the two sub-examples of Example 3) in three different configurations: Base—
uninstrumented browser, no enforcement; IFC—taint tracking from prior work,
but no policy handlers (everything is labeled public);WebPol—our system run-
ning policy handlers and taint tracking.
JavaScript execution time: To measure the overheads of executing policy
handler code, we interacted with all four programs manually by entering rel-
evant data and performing clicks a fixed number of times. For each of these
configurations, we measured the total time spent only in executing JavaScript,
including scripts and policies loaded initially with the page and the scripts and
policies executed in response to events. The difference between IFC and Base
is the overhead of taint tracking, while the difference between the WebPol and
IFC is the overhead of evaluating policy handlers. Since we are only measuring
JavaScript execution time and there are no time-triggered handlers in these ex-
amples, variability in the inter-event gap introduced by the human actor does
not affect the measurements.
The left half of Table 1 shows our observations. All numbers are averages
of 5 runs and the standard deviations are all below 7%. Taint-tracking (IFC)
adds overheads ranging from 15.5% to 26.7% over Base. To this, policy handlers
(WebPol) adds overheads ranging from 1.9% to 29.2%. WebPol overheads are
already modest, but we also note that this is also a very challenging (conserva-
tive) experiment for WebPol. The scripts in both sub-examples of Example 3 do
almost nothing. The scripts in Examples 1 and Example 2 are slightly longer, but
are still much simpler than real scripts. On real and longer scripts, the relative
overheads of evaluating the policy handlers is significantly lower as shown later.
Moreover, our baseline in this experiment does not include other browser costs,
such as the cost of page parsing and rendering, and network delays. Compared
to those, both IFC and WebPol overheads are negligible.
Page load time: We separately measured the time taken for loading the initial
page (up to the DOMContentLoaded event). The difference between WebPol
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JavaScript Execution Time Page Load Time
Website Base IFC WebPol Base IFC WebPol
Password 79.5 115.5(+45.3%)
126
(+13.2%) 303
429
(+41.6%)
441
(+4.0%)
Analytics 273.4 375.1(+37.2%)
386.1
(+4.0%) 2151
2422
(+12.6%)
2499
(+3.6%)
Table 2: Performance on two real-world websites. All time in ms. The percent-
ages in parentheses in the column IFC are overheads relative to Base. Similar
numbers in the column WebPol are additional overheads, still relative to Base.
and IFC is the overhead for parsing and loading policies. The right half of
Table 1 shows our observations. All numbers are the average of 20 runs and all
standard deviations are below 8%. WebPol overheads due to policy parsing and
loading range from 7.2% to 25% (last column). When we add overheads due to
taint tracking (column IFC), the numbers increase to 12.1% to 29.2%. Note that
page-load overheads are incurred only once on every page (re-)load.
Real-world websites. To understand whether WebPol scales to real-world web-
sites, we evaluated WebPol on policies for two real-world applications—the web-
site http://www.passwordmeter.com that deploys a password-strength checker
(similar to Example 1) and a bank login page that includes third-party analytics
scripts (similar to Example 3). Both policies were written by hand and are shown
in Appendix C.
Experience writing policies: In both cases, we were able to come up with
meaningful policies easily after we understood the code, suggesting that WebPol
policies can be (and should be) written by website developers. The policy for the
password-strength checker is similar to Listing 1 and prevents the password from
being leaked to third-parties. We had to write four lines of additional policy code
to allow the script to write the results of the password strength check (which
depends on the password) into the host page. The analytics script on the bank
website communicates all user-behavior to its server. We specified a policy that
disallows exfiltration of keypresses on the username and the password text-boxes
to third-parties.
Performance overheads: We also measured performance overheads on the
two websites, in the same configurations as for the synthetic examples. Table 2
shows the results. On real-world websites, where actual computation is long,
the overheads of WebPol are rather small. The overheads of executing policy
handlers, relative to Base’s JavaScript execution time, are 4.0% and 13.2%,
while the overheads of parsing and loading policies are no more than 4.0%.
Even the total overhead of IFC and WebPol does not adversely affect the user
experience in any significant way.
This experiment indicates that WebPol is suitable for real-world websites.
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7 Related Work
Browser security is a very widely-studied topic. Here, we describe only closely
related work on browser security policies and policy enforcement techniques.
Information flow control and script isolation. The work most closely re-
lated to our is that of Vanhoef et al. [30] on stateful declassification policies in
reactive systems, including web browsers. Their policies are similar to ours, but
there are significant differences. First, their policies are attached to the browser
and they are managed by the browser user rather than website developers. Sec-
ond, the policies have coarse-granularity: They apply uniformly to all events of a
certain type. Hence, it is impossible to specify a policy that makes keypresses in
a password field secret, but makes other keypresses public. Third, the enforce-
ment is based on secure multi-execution [12], which is, so far, not compatible
with shared state like the DOM.
COWL [28] enforces mandatory access control at coarse-granularity. In COWL,
third-party scripts are sandboxed. Each script gets access to either remote servers
or the host’s DOM, but not both. Scripts that need both must be re-factored
to pass DOM elements over a message-passing API (postMessage). This can be
both difficult and have high overhead. For scripts that do not need this factor-
ization, COWL is more efficient than solutions based on FGTT.
Mash-IF [20] uses static analysis to enforce IFC policies. Mash-IF’s model
is different from WebPol’s model. Mash-IF policies are attached only to DOM
nodes and there is no support for adding policies to new objects or events. Also,
in Mash-IF, the browser user (not the website developer) decides what declas-
sifications are allowed. Mash-IF is limited to a JavaScript subset that excludes
commonly used features such as eval and dynamic property access.
JSand [3] uses server-side changes to the host page to introduce wrappers
around sensitive objects, in the style of object capabilities [23]. These wrap-
pers mediate every access by third-party scripts and can enforce rich access
policies. Through secure multi-execution, coarse-grained information flow poli-
cies are also supported. However, as mentioned earlier, it is unclear how secure
multi-execution can be used with scripts that share state with the host page.
WebPol policies are enforced using an underlying IFC component. Although,
in principle, any IFC technique such as fine-grained taint tracking [17,15,7,8],
coarse-grained taint tracking [28] or secure multi-execution [12] can be used with
WebPol, to leverage the full expressiveness of WebPol’s finely-granular policies, a
fine-grained IFC technique is needed. JSFlow [16,15] is a stand-alone implemen-
tation of a JavaScript interpreter with fine-grained taint tracking. Many seminal
ideas for labeling and tracking flows in JavaScript owe their lineage to JSFlow,
but since JSFlow is written from scratch it has very high overheads. Building
on ideas introduced by Just et al. [18], our own prior work [25,7] implements
fine-grained IFC in an existing browser engine, WebKit, by modifying the Java-
Script interpreter. The overheads are significantly lower than JSFlow, which is
why chose to integrate WebPol with our own work. Both JSFlow and our work
include formal proofs that the taint tracking is complete, relative to the abstrac-
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tions of a formal model. Chudnov and Naumann [8] present another approach
to fine-grained IFC for JavaScript. They rewrite source programs to add shadow
variables that hold labels and additional code that tracks taints. This approach
is inherently more portable than that of JSFlow or our work, both of which are
tied to specific, instrumented browsers. However, it is unclear to us how this
approach could be extended with a policy framework like WebPol that assigns
state-dependent labels at runtime.
Access control. The traditional browser security model is based on restricting
scripts’ access to data, not on tracking how scripts use data. However, no model
based on access control alone can simultaneously allow scripts access to data
they need for legitimate purposes and prevent them from leaking the data on
the side. Doing so is the goal of IFC and WebPol. Nonetheless, we discuss some
related work on access control in web browsers.
The standard same-origin policy (SOP) and content-security policy (CSP)
were described in Section 1. An additional, common access policy—cross-origin
resource sharing (CORS) [19]—relaxes SOP to allow some cross-origin requests.
Conscript [22] allows the specification of fine-grained access policies on in-
dividual scripts, limiting what actions every script can perform. Similarly, Ad-
Jail [21] limits the execution of third-party scripts to a shadow page and restricts
communication between the script and the host page. Zhou and Evans [33] take a
dual approach, where fine-grained access control rules are attached to DOM ele-
ments. The rules specify which scripts can and cannot access individual elements.
Along similar lines, Dong et al. [13] present a technique to isolate sensitive data
using authenticated encryption. Their goal is to reduce the size of the trusted
computing base. ADsafe [10] and FBJS [1] restrict third-party code to subsets
of JavaScript, and use static analysis to check for illegitimate access. Caja [2]
uses object capabilities to mediate all access by third-party scripts. WebJail [29]
supports least privilege integration of third-party scripts by restricting script ac-
cess based on high-level policies specified by the developer. All these techniques
enforce only access policies and cannot control what a script does with data it
has been provided in good faith.
8 Conclusion
Third-party JavaScript often requires access to sensitive data to provide mean-
ingful functionality, but comes with the risk that the data may be leaked on the
side. Information flow control in web browsers can solve this problem. Within
this context, this paper proposed WebPol, a mechanism for labeling sensitive
data, dynamically and at fine-granularity. WebPol uses JavaScript for policy
specification, which makes it developer-friendly, and re-uses the browser’s event
handling logic for policy interpretation, which makes it easy to implement and
improves the likelihood of easy portability across browsers and versions. Our
evaluation indicates that WebPol has low-to-moderate overhead, even including
the cost of information flow control and, hence, it can be used on websites today.
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1 document.body.addEventListener("keypress", function(event){
2 var o = window.getComputedStyle(event.target).getPropertyValue("
opacity");
3 if (o < 0.5)
4 event.setLabel("HOST");
5 });
Listing 6: Example policy to prevent overlay-based stealing of keystrokes
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A Preventing overlay-based attacks in WebPol
To bypass WebPol policies, an adversarial script may “trick” a user using trans-
parent overlays. For example, suppose a script wants to exfiltrate the contents of
a password field that is correctly protected by a WebPol policy. The script can
create a transparent overlay on top of the password field. Any password the user
enters will go into the overlay, which isn’t protected by any policy and, hence,
the script can leak the password.
Such attacks can be prevented easily in WebPol using a single policy, attached
to the top element of the page, that labels data entered into all significantly
transparent overlays as HOST. Listing 6 shows such a policy. This particular
policy labels all keypress events on elements of opacity below 0.5 as HOST, thus
preventing their exfiltration. The threshold value 0.5 can be changed, and the
policy can be easily extended to other user events like mouse clicks.
B User-study for WebPol
To understand how easily programmers can use WebPol, we conducted a small
study with six students from our university, recruited through an open call. All
participants knew how to program as we specifically asked for this skill in the
call, but only four knew JavaScript well and of those four, two had studied
information flow control previously. Each participant’s goal was to write policies
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1 document.getElementById("passwordPwd").setLabel("secret");
2 document.getElementById("passwordTxt").setLabel("secret");
3 var x = document.getElementsByTagName("div");
4 var i = 0;
5 for (i = 0; i < x.length; i++)
6 x[i].setLabel("secret");
Listing 7: Policy code for password strength checking website
for four scenarios very similar to Examples 1, 2 and the two sub-examples of
Example 3. The participants were given a document of approximately 2,000
words that explained WebPol and its API, and provided an illustrative example.
The participants were allowed to ask questions about the documentation. Then,
the participants were given the code of the host pages and included third-party
scripts for the four scenarios and were asked to implement policies. They did
this on our running prototype and could see the consequences of their mistakes
in real-time and could debug their policies. The participants had up to one hour
to study the documentation and implement the policies.
Although the study size is quite small to state results with statistical confi-
dence, our observations tend to indicate that WebPol can be used by JavaScript
programmers with a bit of training. All participants were able to complete three
of the four exercises. The two participants who knew about information flow
control were able to complete all four exercises. The exercise that the remaining
four participants could not complete involved context labels and setContext().
This is unsurprising, since context labels are a difficult concept, although they
are not needed very often. The two participants who did not know JavaScript
well encountered another policy independent hurdle: They did not know the syn-
tax for writing JavaScript handlers. Once they were explained this syntax, they
were able to write all policies except the one involving setContext().
Overall, this suggests that JavaScript programmers should be able to use
WebPol with little training, except the context labels. With an understanding of
how information flow tracking works, they should be able to use context labels
as well.
C WebPol policies on real-world websites
TheWebPol policies we wrote for the password strength checking website and the
bank website with an analytics script are shown in Listings 7 and 8, respectively.
The code on lines 3–6 of Listing 7 allows the strength-checking script to write
back the visual indicator of password strength to the host page’s DOM.
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1 var x = document.getElementsByClassName("user"); // username
2 var y = document.getElementsByClassName("pwd"); // password
3 for (i = 0; i < x.length; i++) {
4 x[i].addEventListener("keypress", function(event){
5 event.setLabel("HOST");
6 });}
7 for (i = 0; i < y.length; i++) {
8 y[i].addEventListener("keypress", function(event){
9 event.setLabel("HOST");
10 });}
Listing 8: Policy code for bank login website with an analytics script
